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Transportation Network Companies,
Proposition 22, and the Future of Labor
Relations in the United States

While the victory of Proposition 22 (Prop 22) in the November 3rd, 2020 California
State election came as a shock to many observers, Transportation Network
Companies (TNCs) such as Uber and Lyft, the architects and beneficiaries of the
ballot measure, have a long track record of subverting regulatory attempts. From
this historical perspective, the novelty of Prop 22 is not related to the means
employed in its victory, but in the sheer scale of effort involved. In other words,
Prop 22 represents an escalation of a familiar framework of regulatory subversion
by the TNCs, whose success at the ballot box may turn the initiative campaign into
something of a model for their contemporaries looking to skirt burdensome
regulation or trim labor costs and benefits.
From this vantage, it is rather easy to draw any number of worthwhile lines of
inquiry from Prop 22’s victory, but this paper will concern itself primarily with the
implications of these proceedings on the future of labor relations in this country. It
will strive to address these implications by beginning with an introductory section
that will familiarize the reader with a framework for understanding the TNCs
history of regulatory subversion. Then it will present a brief outline of the relevant
case and legislative history that led the TNCs to pursue Prop 22 in California. From
there, it will take a step back and discuss what Prop 22 does and, by extension, why
it is so crucial for the TNC business model. It will then turn its attention to the proProp 22 campaign and how it used in-app “clicktivism”, political contributions,
misinformation, and superficial racial politics to mobilize the California electorate.
Finally, the paper will close with a section dedicated to parsing the implications of
Prop 22’s passage, especially as they relate to the future of labor relations in this
country.

Nate Midgley
Master of Public Policy,
Portland State University
Contact: nateramidgley@gmail.com
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INTRODUCTION
In January 2018, a report titled Uber State Interface: How Transportation Network
Companies Buy, Bully, and Bamboozle Their Way to Deregulation was released,
which used four years of data and case study analysis to develop a framework of
state interference by transportation network companies (TNCs), such as Uber, Lyft,
and DoorDash. In the report, state interference is defined as “the strategy of
circumventing local democracy by passing state-level laws that prevent cities from
governing on specific issues” and is analogous to legal preemption.1 Typically,
according to this framework, TNCs will enter a local market and ignore existing
transportation regulation regimes – provoking a reaction by entrenched industry
and political interests, such as taxi companies and government regulators. In
response to this pushback – which often takes the form of municipal-level
regulatory attempts – the TNCs will initially attempt to spend their way to state
preemption of these local efforts by leveraging their significant resources into
political capital through expensive lobbyists, advertisements, and political
donations. Should these more traditional legislative efforts fail, they will then
attempt to “bully and bamboozle” their way to important regulatory concessions
via threats and misinformation campaigns that have proven effective at mobilizing
the rideshare consumer base against regulation and neutralizing anti-TNC political
action at the local level.2
Perhaps the most-prized concession sought by TNCs is their ability to
classify their drivers as independent contractors as opposed to employees, which
generally requires state interference “given that the employment relationship is
typically determined by a combination of state and federal laws.”3 This
classification is vital to the TNC business model – a topic to which we will return
– and a number of states, particularly those with ideologically conservative
leadership which have passed legislation facilitating the codification of this TNCfriendly classification regime. Often these statutes were written to preempt existing
local classification regulations, such as in Texas and Pennsylvania. However, a
number were sponsored or even written by TNCs to preempt an otherwise empty
policy field.4

Joy Borkholder et al., Uber State Interference: How TNC’s Buy, Bully, and Bamboozle Their
Way to Deregulation (National Employment Law Project and Partnership for Working
Families, 2018), 10, https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Uber-State-InterferenceHow-Transportation-Network-Companies-Buy-Bully-Bamboozle-Their-Way-toDeregulation.pdf.
2
Borkholder et al, 15.
3
Borkholder et al, 13.
4
Borkholder et al, 20.
1
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Within this framework, the passage of the TNC-sponsored Proposition 22
in California via that state’s ballot initiative process can be viewed as something of
a new phenomenon. Taking advantage of democratic processes is not new for the
TNCs, but Proposition 22 preempts an existing state law – California Assembly
Bill No. 5 (AB 5), passed via the legislature in part to force TNCs to classify their
drivers as employees – whereas the state interference framework outlined by the
Borkholder et al. report was used to explain state interference of local regulation.
However, while this particular aspect of the process was certainly novel,
Proposition 22 is best understood as an escalation of the typical TNC strategy of
state interference, where an existential threat to the TNC business model prompted
further innovation within the existing framework.
This paper will begin with a brief outline of the relevant case and legislative
history which led the TNCs to pursue Proposition 22 in California. From there, it
will discuss what Proposition 22 does and, by extension, why it is so crucial for the
TNC business model. It will then turn its attention to the pro-Proposition 22
campaign and how it used in-app “clicktivism,” political contributions,
misinformation, and superficial racial politics to mobilize the California electorate.
The paper will close with a section dedicated to parsing the implications of
Proposition 22’s passage, including what it portends for the future of labor relations
in this country.

A BRIEF HISTORY
For rideshare drivers, one of the primary appeals – at least initially – of working for
a TNC is the flexible scheduling which gives them some degree of control over
when and where they will work. However, TNC executives have argued since the
industry’s inception that this aspect of employment is contingent upon the driver’s
classification as an independent contractor rather than employee. In the United
States this was generally considered an acceptable tradeoff for the majority of
drivers until wages began to drop below the minimum wage, which began to occur
in California around 2017.5 Compounding this dynamic was the growing sense that
precarity is the Janus-faced twin of flexibility:
Drivers complain of fare cuts, lack of transparency in pay
calculation, high expenses associated with driving, fear of
termination associated with Uber’s rating system, and lack of

5

Mark Erlich, “Construction Workers and the Gig Economy,” Dissent, 2020 Spring Edition,
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/construction-workers-and-the-gig-economy.
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training and driver support – many of which could be addressed
through existing labor and employment laws.6
As the end of this passage suggests, drivers in California and elsewhere
began to link this precarity with their employer-imposed classification as
independent contractors.
When the California Supreme Court released its decision in the 2018
Dynamex Operations v. Superior Court case, a ruling that raised the standards of
independent contractor classification in favor of employees via the rigorous ABC
test, it set the stage for a political showdown between drivers and their TNC
bosses.7 The Dynamex ruling, one of the more famous rulings in a massive case file
of similar litigation, provided the legal foundation for a piece of legislation known
as AB 5 that was signed into law on September 18th, 2019 by California Governor
Gavin Newsom. AB 5 was a huge victory for labor advocates because it codified
the Dynamex ruling’s ABC test into California state law as the default
determination of the employer-employee relationship, meaning that rideshare
drivers would have to meet the following criteria to be classified as independent
contractors:
A. The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring
entity in connection with the performance of the work, both
under the contract for the performance of the work and in
fact.
B. The person performs work that is outside the usual course of
the hiring entity’s business.
C. The person is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature
as that involved in the work performed.8
This mandated re-classification had the potential to open the door for drivers
to receive the sorts of labor protections and benefits, such as a guaranteed minimum

V.B. Dubal, Ruth Berlins Collier, and Christopher Carter, “Disrupting Regulation, Regulating
Disruption: The Politics of Uber in the United States,” University of California Hastings
College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series (2018): 17,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3147296.
7
Andrew Hawkins, “Uber and Lyft drivers could get employment status under California court
ruling,” The Verge, May 1st, 2020, https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/1/17308178/uber-lyftdrivers-california-court-classification-dynamex.
8
Assembly Bill No. 5, California Legislative Assembly, 2019 Regular Session, 4,
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB5.
6
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wage and right to unionize, that are not afforded to independent contractors under
current labor law.9
The TNCs responded to the passage of AB 5 by ignoring the new
classification requirements entirely. Uber released a statement declaring that the
new standards did not change its classification calculation, and cited statistics
showing that the majority of its drivers support their status as independent
contractors.10 There is reason to be skeptical of these figures, however, as the New
York Times have reported on past efforts by the company to manipulate survey
data in its favor.11 Regardless, in the same AB 5 press statement, Uber announced
its intention to begin work with other TNCs to craft the ballot measure campaign
that would become Proposition 22.
However, while the TNCs continued to hold the line on the classification
issue in defiance of AB 5, they were met with resistance from a variety of sources.
David Weil, a former member of the Obama Administration’s Department of
Labor, penned a 2019 Los Angeles Times op-ed condemning the TNCs for their
systematic misclassification of its drivers.12 In 2020, an official California state
order declared that TNC drivers do not meet the criteria established under AB 5 for
independent contractor status.13 Meanwhile, a pair of lawsuits were brought against
Uber and Lyft on behalf of rideshare drivers in order to stop their continued
misclassification under AB 5 and to recover unpaid wages lost due to this
misclassification.14 And in a separate legal case, the San Francisco Superior Court
also found the TNCs to be in violation of AB 5 classification requirements, a ruling

9

Dubal et al, Disrupting Regulation, 7.
Tony West, “Update on AB5,” Uber Newsroom, September 12, 2020,
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/ab5-update.
11
Mike Isaac, “Uber’s C.E.O. Plays with Fire,” New York Times, April 23, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-uber-and-himselfto-the-precipice.html.
12
David Weil, “Op-Ed: Call Uber and Lyft drivers what they are: employees,” Los Angeles Times,
July 05, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-weil-uber-lyft-employeescontractors-20190705-story.html.
13
California Public Utilities Commission, “Order Instituting Rulemaking on Regulations Relating
to Passenger Carriers, Ridesharing, and New Online-Enable Transportation Services,”
COM/GSH/kzl, San Francisco, CA: CPUC, June 9th, 2020, 5.
14
California Labor Commissioner’s Office, “Labor Commissioner’s Office Files Lawsuits against
Uber and Lyft for Engaging in Systemic Wage Theft,” CDIR 2020-65, 5 August 2020,
https://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2020/2020-65.html.
10
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which prompted both Uber and Lyft to threaten to suspend California operations if
the ruling wasn’t overturned on appeal.15
As mentioned in the introduction, this is largely familiar ground for the
TNCs, who are well-versed in using threats and ballot initiatives to skirt
regulation.16 However, what is novel about this particular case is how the level of
needed preemption had changed for the TNCs: while their previous efforts had
focused on preempting local regulation via state interference, in this circumstance,
the TNCs needed to preempt a state regulatory framework. That the TNCs pumped
roughly $200 million into the Proposition 22 campaign, outspending their
opponents nearly 10 to 1, demonstrates the significant savings these companies
expected to accrue via this preemption.17 In the next section we will take a step
backwards and explain what it is about this classification question that is so crucial
to the TNC business model and how Proposition 22 answers it, at least in California.

WHAT PROPOSITION 22 DOES
The core goal of the Proposition 22 campaign was to exempt app-based drivers
from the AB 5 classification regime, and return the sector to a less-stringent
regulatory system that would allow the TNCs to continue categorizing their drivers
as independent contractors.18 Proponents of Proposition 22 spun the regulatory rollback as a potential victory for those drivers who prioritized flexibility, and pointed
to a number of additional benefits they would receive under the ballot measure,
including an earnings guarantee and health care contributions.19 However, the
majority of these benefits are tied to a driver’s “engaged time,” which does not
include a number of work-related actions such as “pumping gas, waiting for a ride
request to pop up on their phones, or wiping vomit from the backseat after dropping
off a drunk passenger who didn’t tip.”20 For example, the earnings guarantee, which
ostensibly sets a floor for driver compensation at 120% of the California minimum
wage, would work out to an estimated $15.60 in 2021. However, a UC Berkeley
Labor study found that after accounting for the full cost of associated expenses and
Clare Roth, “Uber Seeks Court Reprieve After California Shutdown Threat,” Bloomberg News,
August 17th, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-17/uber-seeks-courtreprieve-after-california-shutdown-threat.
16
Dubal et al, Disrupting Regulation, 12.
17
Michelle Chen, “A Blow for Labor Rights in California,” Dissent, November 9th, 2020,
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/a-blow-for-labor-rights-in-california.
18
Ibid.
19
Yes on 22. 2020. “Key Facts About Proposition 22.” Yes on 22, 2020. Retrieved on November
15, 2020 from https://yeson22.com/get-the-facts/.
20
Chen, “A Blow for Labor Rights in California.”
15
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waiting time, the actual take home pay for drivers would be equivalent to $5.64 an
hour, far below both the California and federal minimum wage.21 The other
ancillary benefits included in Proposition 22 are similarly inferior to the protections
granted by standard state and federal labor laws provided to employees but,
crucially, not to independent contractors.
And this is the crux of the matter: TNCs push schedule flexibility
supposedly to empower workers, but the savings they reap from this dubious
classification are so massive that they comprise a major foundation of their overall
business model. To get a sense of these savings, an article in The American
Prospect from October 2020 reported that Uber and Lyft’s misclassification of its
drivers produced a windfall of $413 million in unpaid unemployment insurance
payments alone since 2014.22 And an article in the Spring 2020 edition of Dissent
estimated that TNCs save up 30 percent in labor costs by depriving their drivers of
“a century of hard-won workers’ rights” such as entitlement to overtime
compensation, minimum wage protections, and the right to form a union, among
others.23 These companies do not turn a profit, so this misclassification is one of
the only things, alongside large venture capital subsidies, keeping them afloat while
they wait (and wait) for driverless technology to remove drivers and their associated
costs from the equation altogether.24 When viewed from this perspective, it is
perfectly understandable that the TNCs would view AB 5 as an existential threat,
because its crackdown on employment relationship misclassification
fundamentally destabilizes a key pillar of their business model.
Before moving on, it is worthwhile to consider the implications of this
business model from the perspective of the California State government, its
taxpayers, and the TNC drivers themselves. As outlined in a 2020 study coproduced by the UCLA Labor Center and SEIU-United Healthcare Workers West,
the vast majority of the savings which the TNCs accumulate from their preferred
classification practices is money that would otherwise be going into state worker
protection funds, such as the aforementioned unemployment insurance and workers
compensation programs. The problem is that without that money flowing from the
Ken Jacobs and Michael Reich, “The Effects of Proposition 22 on Driver Earnings: Response to
a Lyft-Funded Report by Dr. Christopher Thornberg,” University of California Berkeley
Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, October 31, 2019, 1,
https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Response-to-Thornberg.pdf.
22
Alexander Sammon, “How Uber and Lyft Are Buying Labor Laws,” The American Prospect,
October 5th, 2020, https://prospect.org/labor/how-uber-and-lyft-are-buying-labor-laws/.
23
Erlich, “Construction Workers and Gig Economy.”
24
Alex Press, “With Prop 22’s Passage in California, Tech Companies Are Just Writing Their
Own Laws Now,” Jacobin, November 6th, 2020, https://jacobinmag.com/2020/11/proposition22-california-uber-lyft-gig-employee.
21
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TNCs into these programs – and other avenues such as the payroll tax, which the
TNCs are also able to dodge via misclassification – the burden for supporting
injured or out of work drivers falls onto the California taxpayer.25 Even in the best
of times this is an onerous arrangement for Californians, but the COVID-19
pandemic has highlighted how inequitable it truly is as the baseline precarity of
rideshare driving has been compounded by virus-related unsafe working
conditions, an economic recession that has seriously curtailed moneymaking
opportunity, and largely unresponsive employers.26 The result has been a workforce
with little recourse but to either suffer alone or turn to the government – and by
extension its taxpayers – for help.
Of course this is the same period during which the TNCs were spending
millions to preserve their preferred classification status, and when viewed from this
perspective, it is rather surprising that Proposition 22 was able to emerge from the
November 2020 election having passed, especially considering that many of
California’s most famous ballot measures – such as Proposition 13 – have
concerned themselves with decreasing the tax burden on state citizens.27
Proposition 22’s victory in this context speaks to the sheer scale and scope of the
effort undertaken by the TNCs. In the next section, we will discuss how they
leveraged their resources to achieve victory.

THE CAMPAIGN
A common-place TNC strategy in regulatory battles is to attempt to turn customers
into political advocates. This is an incredibly innovative tactic that is generally not
typical of a for-profit company, and it has proven very useful in the TNCs quest to
maintain a lucrative business environment. However, while these companies tend
to paint this mobilization as a standard quid pro quo arrangement, where the TNCs
trade a superior product for political support, it obscures the work being done to
mystify the relationship between regulation and the companies’ core business
model.28 This mystification is a necessary part of the broader framework posited by
Borkholder et al which the TNCs employ to “buy, bully and bamboozle” their way
to favorable regulatory regimes. In this section, we will discuss how these
25

Lucero Herrera, Brian Justie, Tia Koonse, and Saba Waheed, Worker Ownership, COVID-19,
and the Future of the Gig Economy (Los Angeles: UCLA: Institute for Research on Labor
and Employment, 2020), accessed November 23, 2020, 7,
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3h60d754.
26
Herrera, 15.
27
Peter Schrag, Paradise Lost: California’s Experience, America’s Future (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1998), 7-23.
28
Borkholder et al, Uber State Interference, 22-23.
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companies leveraged their vast resources – built largely on employment
misclassification and venture capital subsidization – to dupe the California
electorate into passing the regressive Proposition 22.
We have mentioned in a previous section that pro-Proposition 22 spending
totaled roughly $200 million, ten times more than their opposition, which was made
up of a coalition of TNC driver organizations, labor unions, and their grassroots
and political allies. A large portion of this huge sum went to advertisement buys
which bombarded California residents with a relentless onslaught of pro-initiative
propaganda. According to Michelle Chen, writing in Dissent, “spending on
Facebook ads alone topped what either major-party presidential campaign had
spent in state.”29 In addition, some of these advertisements were purposefully
misleading, such as the faux-progressive mailer sent to Bay Area residents that was
designed to appear as if it had come from a non-existent group associated with
Senator Bernie Sanders.30
The TNCs also put their technology to work, flooding app interfaces with a
torrent of misleading messaging that simultaneously framed Proposition 22 as a
pro-driver initiative and the only thing standing between the industry and
annihilation at the hands of anti-tech politicians and regulators.31 This type of
“clicktivism” is a well-worn tactic for TNCs, pairing with their more aggressive
posturing and threats to shape the narrative around regulation.32 In this sense, the
“bully and bamboozle” elements of Borkholder et al’s framework operate hand in
glove to produce the necessary dissonance to facilitate the consumer political
mobilization discussed in the opening paragraph of this section. A clear example of
this manufactured dissonance can be found in the initiative’s working title – the
Protect App-Based Drivers and Service Act – which cast Proposition 22 as the
means to deliver rideshare drivers exactly the sort of protection it was designed to
prevent.33
Finally, it is important to point out the use of racialized arguments by proProposition 22 groups to garner support for the initiative. In the midst of a summer
defined by racial justice protests stemming from the murder of George Floyd,
Chen, “A Blow for Labor Rights in California.”
Mike Moffitt, “Fake progressive mailers urge yes on Uber/Lyft’s Prop. 22,” SFGATE, October
9th, 2020, https://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Fake-progressive-mailers-urge-yes-on-UberLyft-15635173.php.
31
Chen, “A Blow for Labor Rights in California.”
32
Borkholder et al, Uber State Interference, 11.
33
Megan Rose Dickey, “This is the gig worker ballot initiative Uber, Lyft, Doordash and Instacart
are backing,” Tech Crunch, October 29, 2019, https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/29/this-is-thegig-worker-ballot-initiative-uber-lyft-and-doordash-are-backing/.
29
30
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Breonna Taylor, and others at the hands of the police, organizations such as the
NAACP California, Black Lives Matter Sacramento, Hispanic 100, and the Si Se
Puede Foundation provided important endorsements for the initiative.34 However,
it was later revealed that an $85,000 payment had been made to the President of the
California NAACP’s private consulting firm on behalf of the TNCs, which some
critics framed as a quid pro quo exchange for the organization’s endorsement.35
This revelation was part of a larger discourse in which drivers had criticized the
TNCs for their cynical deployment of Black Lives Matter (BLM) messaging.36 For
example, Rideshare Drivers United, a rideshare driver association, published a No
on Proposition 22 factsheet which cited statistics claiming that 70% of rideshare
drivers in this country are people of color, and underscored the hypocrisy of the
TNCs use of BLM talking points in their advertisements and the Proposition 22
political campaign while at the same time pushing policies that “deny their
workforce the wages, benefits, and protections they deserve.”37
In his book Toward Freedom: The Case Against Race Reductionism,
historian Touré Reed argues that a revitalized labor union movement in the United
States is a crucial piece of any program seriously aimed at addressing the material
racial disparities in this country, due in part to the higher wages and benefits
provided to union members and to the overrepresentation of people of color in
membership rolls.38 Policies such as Proposition 22 lock rideshare drivers –
disproportionately people of color – into independent contractor status, preventing
them from the legal means to collectively organize and blocking one of the most
effective tools for racial and economic justice. Additionally, they also prevent
drivers from protection under important anti-discrimination protections.39 As we
will discuss in the final section, this is just the tip of the iceberg of a larger assault
on labor protections that Proposition 22 may help to accelerate.

Matthew Rozsa, “Rideshare drivers say Uber is co-opting anti-racist rhetoric,” Salon, September
10th, 2020, https://www.salon.com/2020/09/10/uber-drivers-protest-oakland-black-livesmatter-co-optation/.
35
Katie Canales, “Prop 22 has courted the endorsement of California’s NAACP president – and
Uber and Lyft have paid her consulting firm $85,000 to boost the controversial measure,”
Business Insider, October 21st, 2020 https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-lyft-paid-naacpalice-huffman-prop-22-2020-10.
36
Rozsa, “Rideshare drivers say Uber is co-opting anti-racist rhetoric.”
37
Rideshare Drivers United, “No on Uber’s Prop 22: Stop Exempting Uber & Lyft from Basic
Labor Laws!” Rideshare Drivers United, retrieved November 22nd, 2020, https://driversunited.org/p/prop22.
38
Touré Reed, Toward Freedom: The Case Against Race Reductionism (New York: Verso, 2020),
168-169.
39
Erlich, “Construction Workers and Gig Economy.”
34
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LOOKING FORWARD
Unfortunately for opponents of Proposition 22, a provision written into the
initiative requires that it can only be overturned by a seven-eighths majority in the
state legislature, making it a nearly impossible task.40 Proposition 22 is here to stay,
and shortly after their victory TNC executives declared their intent to spread the
model elsewhere, whether via state ballot measure, federal statue, or other means.
Despite this optimism, there remain reasons to be skeptical about the long-term
prospects of the TNCs, despite their victory in California. Court cases, government
action, and worker demonstrations across the globe are seriously threatening the
TNCs’ employment classification preference, and the technology needed to replace
drivers doesn’t appear close to completion.41 Furthermore, the TNCs’ desire to
export Proposition 22 won’t be easy, as the initiative’s win has further galvanized
this already sizable grassroots opposition across the country and globe.42 However,
it is impossible to look at Proposition 22’s victory as anything but a major victory
for the TNCs and a setback for rideshare drivers in California and elsewhere, as
well as their allies in the labor movement.
In addition, there are also potentially significant negative implications for
workforces outside of the rideshare industry, including for blue-collar workers,
public sector employees, and white-collar professionals. As Erlich point outs in
Dissent, AB 5 is likely to “have just as large an impact on more traditional
industries, such as construction, trucking, hospitality, and janitorial services,”
which also rely on misclassifying workers in order to keep labor costs low.43
Policies such as Proposition 22 may incentivize these industries to seek similar
carveouts. The initiative’s victory could also further incentivize the privatization of
government service, as budgetary crises spur local and state government to look to
save money by offloading burdensome public sector union contracts. For example,
a cash-strapped jurisdiction legally obligated to balance its budget and dealing with
reduced revenues and increased expenditures thanks to the COVID-19 crisis may
find a significant savings on labor costs extremely attractive and elect to contract
out its service provision via independent contractors. If this seems unlikely,
consider that a large portion of the white-collar professionals that Google employs
are classified as independent contractors, and it becomes apparent that this

Chen, “A Blow for Labor Rights in California.”
Press, “With Prop 22’s Passage in California.”
42
Chen, “A Blow for Labor Rights in California.”
43
Erlich, “Construction Workers and Gig Economy.”
40
41
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particular innovation may be, as Press writes in Jacobin, “the future of work for us
all if Silicon Valley has anything to say about it.”44
The TNCs’ campaign to overturn AB 5 – built on an escalation of their
typical “barge into, buy, bully, and bamboozle” strategy of state interference – and
their utilization of a business model predicated on labor arbitrage has provided a
ready-made playbook for other powerful business and corporate interests to draw
from. To this end – and in only a few short months since the initiative’s passing –
the California economy is already feeling exactly these sorts of knock-on effects.
In January of 2021, Albertsons, the second largest grocery chain in the country, laid
off its entire staff of unionized delivery drivers in California and replaced them with
independent contractors.45 From this perspective, Proposition 22 represents a
significant step towards an economy-wide circumvention of the labor rights and
protections fought for and won by the labor movement during the early part of the
20th Century.
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